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How China’s Employment Problems Became Trade Problems     
China, Labor Law and the Rule of Lawi   
Introduction  
 
The global downturn that began in 2007 has left the world poorer 
and less stable.  For many people, the greatest loss has been in jobs and 
opportunities.ii   International Labor Organization (ILO) Director General 
Juan Somavia claims the world is facing a “global jobs crisis,” but 
policymakers have made creating domestic jobs their top priority.”iii  
Presidents, prime ministers, and premiers all recognize that if they can’t 
establish an environment conductive to generating private sector jobs, 
their country may experience stalled economic growth, increased poverty, 
rising social tensions, political upheaval, and/or emigration. If these men 
and women can’t create jobs for their fellow citizens, they may be out of a 
job.iv   
Perhaps the pressure to create jobs is greatest in China, the world’s 
most populous nation.v   According to China’s state council, “China has a 
population of nearly 1.3 billion, and is the most populous country in the 
world. To solve the employment issue in China is a strenuous, arduous and 
pressing task… China has a prooactive employment policy…and has done 
everything possible to… keep the unemployment rate within a socially 
tolerable range.”vi Not surprisingly, in March 2009, Chinese Premier Wen 
Jiabao stated, "We will do everything in our power to stimulate 
employment."vii 
But China’s willingness to “do everything” may also effect 
employment and economic growth in other countries.  Job creation is not a zero sum game, where the jobs gained in one nation are lost in another.  
But how a nation creates or preserves jobs can have implications for the 
terms of trade in another.   For example, policymakers can stimulate the 
demand for workers by increasing demand for various goods (as through 
domestic stimuli). Such stimuli may or may not distort trade.  
Alternatively, they can reduce the cost of workers to firms by decreasing 
payroll taxes, ignoring minimum wages or other job-related costs.  They 
can also reduce the supply of workers (by restricting immigration) or 
encouraging workers to retire.  Some governments promote job sharing to 
keep more people employed.  And finally, policymakers can keep the costs 
of workers artificially low by reducing the power or ability of workers to 
organize, bargain collectively, or strike.  However, in so doing, such 
officials ignore international human rights obligations as well as domestic 
law.  
In this article, I focus on the potential trade spillovers of Chinese 
policies to maintain employment. The argument unfolds as follows:  
Chinese leaders are determined to maintain employment and have long 
ignored employment laws that could empower workers.  But in 2007, 
China reformed its labor laws and allowed wide public comment.  It did not 
change these laws as a quid pro quo to join the WTO, but in revising these 
laws, China acted in accordance with WTO norms of transparency, due 
process, and public participation.  The new laws enhanced protections for 
workers, but the consensus among scholars, NGOs, and the US State 
Department is that these labor laws, like earlier laws, are unevenly and 
rarely enforced.  Herein we define labor laws as laws that encompass the 
employer/employee relationship. Some labor laws relate to conditions of 
work; others are designed to encourage employment. Labor laws can 
include regulations of hours of work; laws to regulate labor supply or to 
prevent unemployment; laws to protect child workers or provisions related 
to freedom of workers to associate.viii  It is important to note that although 
national governments decide their labor laws, some labor laws address 
fundamental human rights which governments are obligated to respect 
under international law.  These include the right to work, freedom of 
association, the right to join a trade union, and the right to work for a fair 
wage in a safe environment.ix  
In recognition that employment laws in one country can affect 
employment conditions in another, the signatories of the Treaty of 
Versailles established the International Labor Organization (ILO) in 1919.  
Its Preamble states, “the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions 
of labor is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve 
the conditions in their own countries.”x If a government ignores its own 
labor laws, it is effectively allowing its labor intensive firms to become 
more cost competitive with imports. As economist Drusilla Brown has 
noted, if the country has international market power (as does China), the 
contraction in the demand for imports will also reduce the world price of 
imports, giving rise to a terms-of-trade improvement.  If governments 
attempt to achieve a strategic advantage through their labor standards 
they are effectively nullifying market access for some of their trade 
partners. xi   The WTO does not cover employment issues explicitly, but 
policymakers who are concerned about the trade spillovers of China’s 
employment policies have leverage on China.  Under GATT Article XXIII, 
any country in the WTO is entitled to "right of redress" for changes in 
domestic policy that systematically erode market access commitments even 
if no explicit GATT rule has been violated.xii  Used creatively, this strategy 
could enable WTO member states to encourage China to do a better job of 
enforcing its labor laws and an incentive to meet its market access 
commitments.   
Moreover, as part of its accession agreement, China was “required to 
enforce the rule of law throughout all of its territories.”xiii  China revised 
its labor laws in an attempt to empower workers.  However, policymakers 
also recognize if workers were empowered, labor prices might rise and 
unemployment could increase.  Herein I hypothesize that with the 
downturn in trade; it seems likely that China has not made sufficient effort 
to either educate workers and managers about their rights and 
responsibilities under the law or to educate policymakers throughout 
China as to their enforcement obligations.    
I begin the article by describing the unusual political economy of 
China. I then discuss a little remembered fact—that the postwar planners 
who designed the world trade system saw trade liberalization as a means 
to achieving greater employment.  They developed rules to regulate not 
only protectionism, but the use of trade or labor policies to distort trade.  
Their belief that trade and employment policies should be linked is 
expressed in the preamble of the GATT and the WTO, but until recently, this linkage was ignored.  However, I argue, the global downturn and the 
threat of “beggar thy neighbor” policies have reminded government 
officials of the necessity of collaboration in trade and employment.   I next 
discuss rule of law in the WTO.  I note that norms regarding the rule of 
law underpin the GATT/WTO but they are implicit.  However, China 
became the first (but not only) nation to have explicit rule of law 
obligations. These obligations include the responsibility to enforce all of its 
laws including those governing labor.   (Obviously China is not the only 
country with difficulties enforcing the rule of law regarding labor as well 
as other trade related policies).  I then suggest a way in which WTO 
members can address this problem, while at the same time provide 
incentives to China to improve its rule of law. xiv  Finally, I explain why all 
WTO member states will benefit by working multilaterally to encourage 
China to take steps that improve the rule of law.   I do not include a 
separate section on previous scholarship on the relationship of labor law 
and trade, but instead embed it in the various sections of the article. 
Background on China, Jobs and Trade 
China’s regulatory and trade practices can move global markets. 
China acceded to the WTO in 2001. xv  In some 10 years of WTO 
membership China has moved from the 7th largest trading nation in 2000 
to the world’s 3rd largest trading nation in 2010. It has supplanted 
Germany as the greatest exporter; it is also the world’s largest recipient of 
investment, and the world’s leading provider of manufactured goods. xvi  By 
importing a wide range of manufactured goods and commodities such as 
oil, turbines, electrical machinery and plastics, China has clearly created jobs abroad.xvii  However, the efficiency and scale of China’s manufacturing 
has pushed down the price of many manufactured products relative to 
other goods and services.xviii   
China’s competitive advantage is derived from several factors.  
Many analysts believe that Chinese policymakers deliberately keep the 
value of its currency, the remimbi (also known as the yuan), low in order to 
stimulate exports.xix   Economists and policymakers increasingly rail 
against China’s currency practices.xx Second, Chinese policymakers 
actively promote and subsidize exports and provide exporting firms with 
cheap credit and energy.xxi   
In addition, China’s workers are unusually productive, docile, and 
relatively inexpensive, compared to workers in other developing countries 
and the industrialized world (although this is changing).  Foreign investors 
have been willing to be patient and to transfer technology, business 
practices, and business processes in order to possibly serve China’s 
growing and already sizeable consumer markets.xxii   Firms in other 
countries which rely on higher priced and even more productive workers 
find it difficult to compete with many Chinese manufacturers.    
China has about one quarter of the world’s workers and about 1.5 
times the combined workforce of all developed states. Many of these 
workers are literate and productive. They are also plentiful--the Chinese 
workforce is growing some 11% per year.  Finally, these workers are 
relatively cheap.   Although the nominal exchange rate appreciated by 15% 
from1998-2008, Niall Ferguson and Moritz Schularick find that manufacturing in China “is much cheaper in dollar terms than it was eight 
years ago.”xxiii   
Foreign investors are eager to take advantage of this unusual 
combination of efficient, productive, low wage labor to serve China’s 
growing internal market or to produce goods for exports. However, many of 
these same investors, alas, have not become demandeurs of good 
governance. China has a culture of non-compliance, where bad actors set 
the norm, where laws and regulations are often ignored or unevenly 
enforced, and where many citizens including workers don’t know their 
rights under the law.xxiv Meanwhile, the Communist party often owns and 
operates or is tied to private enterprises in key sectors such as 
transportation, energy and banking. Political and economic decisions 
governing these firms are often made in an opaque and manipulative 
manner. Sometimes China’s laws are enforced; other times they are 
ignored. As one Chinese banker put it, “It’s quite hard to compete when 
you are playing against the referee.”xxv 
China’s inadequate governance at the provincial level is due to a 
wide range of reasons: corruption, a lack of uniformity among rules; and 
arbitrary abuse of power.  Meanwhile, at the national level, the 
Communist Party is at times willing to ignore its international 
commitments in order to maintain power.xxvi  As the US Congressional 
Executive Commission on China reported in 2009, “the Communist Party 
rejects the notion that upholding the rule of law should preempt the 
Party’s role in guiding the functions of the state.”xxvii China’s rulers are so afraid of political upheaval that they subsidize inefficient factories to 
maintain employment and forestall social and political protest.    
Since 2007, foreign investors have become increasingly anxious 
about China.  With a wide range of food and product safety scandals, trade 
diplomats and investors have become increasingly worried about China’s 
willingness to respect the rule of law.xxviii   European and American 
business groups investing in China have issued public warnings that they 
perceive that China is becoming more interventionist and protectionist.xxix 
Other nations have responded to these concerns with policies that both 
single out Chinese exports and which may also distort trade.xxx       
China is in many ways an outlier. Its system of governance coupled 
with its inadequate governance should discourage foreign investors.xxxi  
Nonetheless, many executives from the US and Europe claim they have no 
choice but to invest and produce there, given its huge market and 
productive workforce.xxxii   Some observers argue that because of its market 
power, China cannot be reined in by existing international institutions. 
However, China’s participation in the WTO has given other countries 
leverage to insure that China adheres to internationally accepted trade 
norms of transparency, most favored nation and national treatment.  
The Historic Albeit Implicit Link between Trade and Employment 
  The architects of the world trading system saw trade as a tool to 
stimulate economic growth and employment.  They believed that “beggar 
thy neighbor trade policies” had not protected jobs, but in fact limited job 
creation and economic growth.  Under the influence of Lord Keynes, Sir 
James Meade and others, they believed that governments had a responsibility to create the conditions for expanded employment. But they 
also put forward a broader more radical paradigm: that by collaborating to 
regulate protectionism, the global and national economies could flourish, 
creating more jobs for more people globally as well as nationally. Thus, 
they designed the international system governing trade to link trade and 
employment. xxxiii   
From 1946-1948, the postwar planners developed plans for a new 
organization, the International Trade Organization (ITO) to govern not 
only trade, but employment, competition policy, and other issues that could 
affect trade flows. Fifty four countries met at Havana Cuba from 1947-
1948 to negotiate at the International Conference on Trade and 
Employment. Article 3 of the ITO Charter stated their approach: “Each 
Member shall take action designed to achieve and maintain full and 
productive employment and large and steadily growing demand within its 
own territory through measures appropriate to its political, economic and 
social institutions…. Measures to sustain employment, production and 
demand shall be consistent with the other objectives and provisions of this 
Charter.”  Article 7 added an important caveat “The Members recognize 
that unfair labour conditions, particularly in production for export, create 
difficulties in international trade, and, accordingly, each Member shall 
take whatever action may be appropriate and feasible to eliminate such 
conditions within its territory.” xxxiv 
However, the world never achieved clear rules on the relationship 
between trade and employment.  The US Congress never voted on the 
Charter and appeared unlikely to approve it.xxxv  Ever so gradually, without deliberate intent, policymakers relied on the GATT, the part of the 
ITO which governed commercial policies (border measures like tariffs and 
exchange controls).  The GATT was supposed to be a temporary 
replacement, until GATT members could negotiate a new formal 
organization. Alas, that did not happen until the Uruguay Round 1986-
1993.  
In the decades that followed, some member states tried to include 
employment issues in the GATT.  They were not able to convince other 
GATT member states that these issues belonged in the agreement. Many 
developing country policymakers feared enhanced language on labor issues 
would provide a subterfuge for protectionism.  The proponents of a more 
explicit link consistently failed to convince the bulk of GATT member 
states to make sure a link.xxxvi  But from 1948-1993, GATT grew in scale 
and scope.  Members negotiated new rules to govern the use of non-tariff 
trade barriers and subsidies. But the only mention of trade and 
employment was in GATT’s preamble, which stated that trade relations 
“should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring 
full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income 
and effective demand.”xxxvii     
During the Uruguay Round of trade talks from 1986-1993, members 
agreed to create a formal international organization, the WTO.   But the 
World Trade organization, which came into existence in 1995, had no 
explicit language on the relationship between employment policies and 
trade. As before, some members of the WTO posited trade could create a 
virtuous circle:  by regulating protectionism, trade could expand.  Firms could achieve economic efficiencies—producing more goods and services at 
lower costs.  More people would have jobs, access to new opportunities, and 
ultimately see improvements in economic welfare.  By collaborating to 
regulate protection, the signatories could ensure that trade liberalization 
would essentially work for more of the world’s workers. In this way trade 
would be mutually beneficial for all of the members of the WTO 
stimulating economic growth and creating jobs. xxxviii  
But this supposedly virtual circle didn’t come round for all countries.  
By the 1990s, it became increasingly clear that given global markets for 
capital, goods and labor, the world, especially industrialized countries, had 
a surplus of unskilled labor.  Industrialized country policymakers feared 
they would lose their manufacturing capacity as well as manufacturing 
jobs. And many developing country policymakers worried that they could 
not compete with countries like China and to a lesser extent India, which 
have an advantage in labor intensive manufacturing.xxxix  In 1996, the 
OECD issued a study which examined the relationship of trade and labor 
standards. The researchers asserted that there is no correlation between 
real wage growth and labor rights or that countries with lower labor 
standards had an advantage in exporting.xl  But policymakers, scholars, 
and workers continued to express concerns about the relationship between 
trade, employment and labor standards. In 1998, the members of the ILO 
adopted a Declaration on Fundamental principles and rights at work.  This 
declaration obligations ILO member states to respect four core rights:  
"freedom of association and recognition of the right to collective 
bargaining," the "elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor," the "effective abolition of child labor," and the "elimination of 
discrimination in respect of employment and occupation."  In addition, 
member states were not to use labor standards for protectionist trade 
purposes (or to ignore such standards in the perceived interest of 
expanding trade.xli   Still the ILO and the WTO did not develop a formal 
working relationship until  2007, when the two organizations agreed to 
partner to examine the relationship between trade and employment; they 
issued their first report in 2008.xlii   
However, the two organizations began to collaborate at 
approximately the same time that the U.S. experienced a financial 
meltdown. The downturn quickly spread around the world.  Trade shrank 
dramatically; and as noted earlier many people, particularly the most 
vulnerable, lost their jobs.  This created a vicious cycle, as the example of 
Spain illuminates.  In recent years, many immigrants from Latin America 
came to Spain, but not surprisingly these immigrants were among the first 
to experience unemployment with the downturn.  Many left Spain, and 
that in turn furthered a decline in exports.  According to Giovanni Peri and 
Francisco Requena, with fewer immigrants, Spanish exporters found fewer 
markets abroad. They concluded, “Such a negative impact on export may 
actually exacerbate the negative effect of recession on GDP.”xliii  
The crisis also allowed more policymakers to go public with their 
concerns that domestic policies designed to stimulate employment could 
affect trade, just as trade policies could undermine employment at the 
national level.  As the crisis began, the members of the G-20 (the world’s 
20 largest economies) met in Washington to develop a collaborative response. In a summit declaration they stated, “reforms will only be 
successful if grounded in a commitment to free market principles, 
including the rule of law, respect for private property, open trade and 
investment.”  They agreed to “refrain from raising new barriers to 
investment or to trade in goods and services, imposing new export 
restrictions, or implementing World Trade Organization (WTO) 
inconsistent measures to stimulate exports.”xliv  
In London, the G-20 agreed to continue to refrain from 
protectionism, and to “rectify promptly any such measures. We extend this 
pledge to the end of 2010. “xlv At the behest of the G-20, the WTO agreed to 
use its trade policy review body to examine the behavior of member states 
in response to the global downturn.  The members agreed to focus on 
domestic policies that could distort trade, such as the adoption of domestic 
stimuli.xlvi  These governments hoped to use “naming and shaming” to 
limit trade distortions from these policies and help the global economy 
recover.xlvii  In 2009, the WTO reported that the drop in global demand 
“seems to have prompted members whose growth was previously driven to 
a great extent by exports…to re-evaluate their economic development 
strategies.”xlviii   
At the most recent G-20 summit in Pittsburgh, USA the attendees 
agreed to collaborate to build “an employment-oriented framework for 
future economic growth….The international institutions should consider 
ILO standards and the goals of the Jobs Pact in their crisis and post-crisis 
analysis and policy-making activities…We direct our Ministers to assess 
the evolving employment situation, review reports from the ILO and other organizations on the impact of policies we have adopted.”xlix But neither 
the 20 biggest economies nor WTO members have directly addressed how 
the WTO might deal with a country or countries that might distort trade 
through domestic policies designed to preserve or create jobs.    
                       Rule of Law, China and the WTO 
The GATT/WTO was set up to ensure that when individuals or 
commercial interests trade, that process follows the rule of law. Scholars 
generally define the rule of law as a system that attempts to protect the 
rights of citizens from arbitrary and abusive use of government power.  
The rule of law thus assures market participants that the government will 
adopt a hands-off approach to investments and production, allowing those 
participants to fully exercise their rights in relation to land, labor and 
capital. l  
The GATT/WTO agreements extend the rule of law across borders.  
These agreements allow nations with very different governance systems or 
levels of development to find common ground on the many rules (from 
health and safety standards to procurement and tax policies) that can 
affect trade flows. The WTO requires member states to follow norms of 
market access and nondiscrimination between domestic and foreign 
entities.  In addition, by creating and transmitting norms of due process, 
predictability, and transparency, the WTO agreements help make member 
states accountable not only to foreign market actors, but also to their 
citizens.li    
 The WTO’s agreements “provide the legal ground-rules for 
international commerce.”lii  As economists Kyle Bagwell, Petros Mavroidis, and Robert Staiger have noted, the GATT agreements create “a system of 
property rights over negotiated market access commitments that are 
secure against unilateral government infringement.”liii  However, 
unilateral government infringement can include the failure of a country to 
enforce its own laws. Because the Chinese government often acts in an 
arbitrary, opaque and corrupt manner, the property rights established 
under WTO rules were not and are not always “secure” in China.liv  For 
this reason, the members of the WTO held China on a tight leash. 
                               China’s accession agreement 
When countries apply for WTO membership, they begin a process 
where other nations review not just their trade policies but their 
governance capacity. Some countries are required not only to change their 
laws to meet WTO norms, but how they make laws, so that the process is 
transparent, predictable, and follows norms of due process lv  The members 
of the WTO set up a working party to review each potential member. The 
deliberations always began with a discussion of how these countries made 
public policy and promulgated trade policies.lvi The process for China was 
similar.  
The members of the WTO required that China make significant 
changes to its governance in order to join the WTO.  The 2001 Protocol on 
the Accession of the People’s Republic of China explicitly calls on China to 
“apply and administer in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner all 
its laws, regulations and other measures of the central government as well 
as local regulations, rules and other measures…pertaining to or affecting 
trade….  China shall establish a mechanism under which individuals and enterprises can bring to the attention of the national authorities cases of 
non-uniform application.”lvii  Finally, it calls on China to ensure that “those 
laws, regulations and other measures pertaining to and affecting trade 
shall be enforced.”lviii    This obviously includes laws related to 
employment.  WTO diplomats recognized that China, like many developing 
countries, would need help and time (as well as expertise, funds and will) 
to improve its governance.   
                       China’s compliance with its WTO obligations 
The members of the WTO have twice reviewed China’s compliance 
with its WTO commitments in 2006 and in 2008.  These reviews reveal a 
mixed picture. China has generally taken a wide range of steps towards 
full compliance, but it has yet to meet many of its existing obligations. 
Moreover, members are not optimistic about China’s future behavior.  
Some observers note an unanticipated consequence of WTO membership is 
that the changes required by China to meet its obligations have created 
disaffected groups who are increasingly prominent and vocal.  The 
Communist party may need to appease these groups to hold onto power.lix 
  Legal Scholar Julia Ya Qin concluded that “China has shown a 
mixed record in implementing its Protocol obligations. It “met 
substantially all of its market access commitments in goods and services,” 
but “has not fully complied with its special rule obligations of the Protocol.” 
It delayed notification of its government subsidies and resisted the 
transitional review mechanism, at time refusing to answer questions posed 
by other members.lx   The new labor contract law did not go into effect until January 1 
2008, so it was too early for WTO member states to discuss it. However, 
China’s failure to enforce the rule of law related to employment issues falls 
under its binding obligations under WTO rules, as set out in China’s 
Protocol of Accession. The next section delineates China’s recent labor 
practices, how they may affect China’s trade and trade partners, and why 
they breach China’s international obligations.  
Labor Conditions and Issues in China 
In China, people are plentiful, but the supply of jobs is insufficient.  
Chinese rulers must find jobs for the tens of millions of workers that enter 
the economy each year, and maintain a high rate of GDP growth.  As a 
result, Chinese policies lurch between empowering workers and ensuring 
that both foreign and domestic employers find Chinese workers affordable, 
docile, and easy to hire or fire.     
China’s ability to create jobs for its people has global repercussions. 
China has more than 750 million workers—more than the workforce of the 
OECD nations combined. The World Bank has estimated China’s labor 
force as of 2005 accounted for almost 26% of the world total of workers and 
27% of employed workers.  China also has some 800 million peasants many 
of whom are desperate for employment and other means of providing for 
their families. China also has some 230 million migrant workers who are 
not tethered to the land.lxi During the period 1991-2005, the work force 
increased on average by some 10.29 million workers, but only 7.05 million 
of these workers found jobs.lxii In recent years, the most educated students have had an even harder time finding job including some 30% of university 
graduates.lxiii  
As a sovereign country, China is free to develop policies to maintain 
and increase employment. However, as a member of the WTO, when 
Chinese leaders make labor policies, the government must not do so in 
ways that distort trade or breach China’s international obligations.   
There is a growing scholarly and policymaker consensus that 
China’s employment and trade practices have negatively affected 
employment levels and wages in other countries.  For example, a 2009 
study by Mion, Vandenbussche, and Zhu found that China’s imports have a 
stronger job displacement effect in Belgium than imports from other low-
wage countries. Driffield and Chiang found that Taiwanese investment in 
China has contributed to rising unemployment in Taiwan.lxiv  R. Scott of 
the Economic Policy Institute asserts that from 2001-2007, Chinese 
exports displaced 2.3 million jobs in the U.S. and lowered average U.S. 
wages for workers without a college degree by $1,400. (This analysis 
presumes that Chinese exports displace U.S. production, which may not 
always be true).  Scott also notes that China has “suppressed the 
purchasing power of its own middle class with a weak currency,” and 
encouraged inflation.lxv  Finally, a 2008 joint ILO/WTO study on the 
impact of trade upon employment speaks diplomatically and generically, 
about the impact of increased China trade on employment in other 
countries. The authors noted “increased openness in middle-income 
countries reduced the relative demand for unskilled workers by causing 
sectors of low-skill intensity to contract.”lxvi    While China’s leaders endeavor to create jobs, many of China’s 
people struggle to provide for their families. China is plagued by 
imbalances in development between urban and rural, between regions, 
between sexes and between different population groups.  As these 
imbalances become increasingly visible to growing numbers of the Chinese 
people, they are taking to the streets.lxvii Unofficial figures put the number 
of mass protests in 2008 at 127,000, almost 50 percent higher than the last 
officially released figure of 87,000 in 2005.lxviii Such protests could threaten 
the informal compact between the Communist party and the Chinese 
people to deliver economic growth, social and technological progress while 
maintaining control.  China’s ruling elite recognize that they must provide 
more of their people with greater opportunities and access to education, 
credit, jobs and opportunities.   
 Not surprisingly China relies on trade to increase growth and to 
provide jobs. Trade official Wu Yi explained China’s approach in 1998: “If 
we cannot keep exports and investment growing, our macroeconomic 
growth target will be at risk …. It's not exports for exports’ sake.  We have 
to help achieve an 8 per cent growth rate in GDP …. Proper export growth 
is critical in helping the nation reform State-owned enterprises, create jobs 
and promote social stability.”lxix  
 In 2002, the Chinese Communist Party made employment 
generation one of the government’s main policy priorities, stressing that 
this goal could be achieved by promoting the market power of workers, 
increasing the protection of workers, and expanding social welfare.lxx Labor 
law reforms as well as new programs were designed to achieve these goals. Although a growing number of Chinese citizens have moved from abject 
poverty to working or middle class, wages have declined in real terms. In 
the period 1995-2005, Time Magazine reported that wages averaged 
approximately $80 per month from 1995-2005. In 2008, the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Security admitted found that average pay in real terms 
declined by some 30% for factory workers.lxxi  Wages have been suppressed 
by the inability of workers to demand higher wages; the large supply of 
individuals willing to work for these wages; and the constant pressure on 
managers to keep costs down.    
In 2007-2008, the Chinese leadership developed several new laws 
designed to empower workers. The Labor Mediation and Arbitration Law 
went into effect May 1, 2008, and the Employment Promotion Law and the 
new Labor Contract law went into effect January1 2008.  The Labor 
Contract Law requires employers to provide employment contracts for all 
workers; minimum terms implied by law or collective agreement if no 
written contract; sets limits to casual employment; mandates firms to 
allow unions; and finally, mandates employers to consult with the union 
before adopting or changing policies that have a “direct bearing” on 
matters of interest to employees.lxxii In contrast to the 1994 Labor Law 
which loosened state control over labor relations and gave broad discretion 
to employers, the new labor laws impose greater constraints on employer 
discretion and take a more protective stance towards workers.lxxiii Article 4 
of the Labor Contract Law requires all employers to consult with either a 
union or elected worker representatives before approving enterprise rules 
on work and employment conditions. Moreover, the law states that employees who become worker representatives shall not be subject to 
discrimination and shall have access to management and co-workers in 
order to carry out their representative functions.  These provisions 
redefined the obligations between employer and employee and obligate the 
government to make sure that employers pay their workers.lxxiv   
Analysis of the new labor law and China’s commitment to enforcement 
The Chinese government claims that the law is already helping 
workers and improving the work place.  They assert that more firms have 
signed long-term contracts with employees and it has not driven up labor 
costs.lxxv  The Wall Street Journal reported that the new law had led to 
some 760,000 labor arbitrations in 2009. These arbitrations focus on 
contract violations or lost wages.lxxvi   However, there are no reliable 
statistics on enforcement of the law so we must rely on scholar, NGO, and 
government impressions.   
Three legal scholars traveled to China to examine the impact of the 
legislation so far. Virginia Harper Ho believes the new law has already 
changed China by making it easier for workers to litigate in their interest 
and prodding employers to pay attention to workers demands    However, 
Aaron Halegua argues the law is insufficient to change the behavior of 
employers because it is not enforced and because the official union does not 
protect the interest of workers.lxxvii Sean Cooney states that the legal 
“framework is undermined by a profusion of imprecise and sometimes 
contradictory legal rules, a bureaucratic ‘command and control’ approach 
to inspection and dispute resolution, and a narrow and ineffective range of tools for inducing compliance.” He concludes that the culture of 
noncompliance impedes better compliance with the law.lxxviii   
The US Department of State also found little improvement for 
China’s workers.  In its annual report on human rights, it found that 
workers are repeatedly harassed and intimidated by criminal elements 
(often hired by employers). State also noticed that in 2008, “auditors 
working for foreign buyers continued to report a low but increasing 
incidence of child labor in factories producing for export.” The labor law 
mandates a 40-hour standard workweek but standards were regularly 
violated. Inadequate and poorly enforced health and safety standards put 
workers’ well being and lives and lives at risk. Although workers were 
willing to use lawsuits to pursue employers who did not follow the law, 
access to legal aid was and remains limited.lxxix 
Independent NGOs both on and off the mainland also found major 
labor law abuses continue despite the law.  The International Trade Union 
confederation annually surveys countries for their treatment of workers. It 
found that the law does not give Chinese workers the right to strike or 
form their own unions. Individuals who attempt to unionize groups of 
workers or organize protests are often arrested and sometimes sentenced 
to jail.lxxx  
In November 2009, China Labor Watch reported that several of Wal-
mart supplier factories did not provide copies of contracts to their workers. 
Workers then were unable to quit and obtain full pay.  It also found 
workers were not paid for overtime work violations as required under the 
law.lxxxi  The NGO found even worse conditions for workers supplying Dollar General, a low price retailer.  Workers were not paid in time, 
frequently injured and paid illegally low wages.lxxxii  The Shenzhen 
Dagongzhe Migrant Worker Center surveyed workers in different areas of 
Shenzhen. Some 320 individuals (from 380 sent) responded to the 
questionnaire.  The survey found workers had experienced violations of 
contracts (such as not writing them in Chinese); incomplete contracts; 28% 
of the contracts offered wages lower than the legal minimum wage.  The 
authors claimed that the survey showed 79.2% of workers are dissatisfied 
with their work situation and wanted stronger implementation of the law. 
lxxxiii   
The central government has so-far done little to clarify 
governmental and managerial obligations and to educate workers on their 
rights. lxxxiv   For example, European Business in China, a business 
organization, noted that authorities and courts throughout the country 
interpreted the law differently. In an assessment of Chinese labor policy, it 
concluded that the legislation widened the gap between law and reality, 
“while further discouraging enforcement and adherence to the law.”lxxxv 
Perhaps such uneven enforcement should not surprise us; China’s 
provincial governments have rarely been diligent in the enforcement of 
national labor legislation, particularly when it is in conflict with local 
economic interests.lxxxvi    
Taken in sum, the new law has done little to create a culture of 
compliance among firms manufacturing in China.  Managers are often 
unaware of their obligations of the law.  Secondly, managers are under 
even worse financial pressures as before the law.  In order to maintain export related jobs, they believe they must keep costs down and thereby 
suppress worker wages and workers’ ability to challenge labor decisions. 
Finally, the law does nothing to rectify substandard practices among the 
firms most directly targeted by the new laws. lxxxvii  
Recent Policy Developments to Maintain employment 
The global financial crisis has increased pressure on the Chinese 
government to maintain jobs.  Chinese workers have lost jobs. In a June 
2009 survey of 100 foreign firms operating in China, 37 reduced 
employment of Chinese workers.lxxxviii The Chinese government responded 
to this situation by maintaining artificially low labor costs and by 
stimulating domestic demand and production. These strategies were not 
always consistent with China’s WTO obligations.  
In 2009, the Chinese government reported that 20 million 
individuals in China's coastal areas had lost their jobs due to the global 
economic slowdown in 2009.  They would soon be joined by a record 6.1 
million college students preparing to graduate and join the army of 
jobseekers.lxxxix Officials acknowledged that the newly unemployed and 
never-employed individuals could affect social stability, according to Zhang 
Xiaojing, director of the Macroeconomy Office of the Institute of Economics 
at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. In December 2008, the State 
Council, China’s highest governing body, ordered local governments to 
create jobs for some 230 million migrant workers who had returned to 
their home towns. The Financial Times reported that the Communist party 
was particularly concerned about disgruntled students who might be 
willing to incite a rebellion, as in Tiananmen Square in 1989.xc   Although the Chinese leadership freely acknowledged its concerns 
about social stability, it stated that the new labor laws would not be 
revised to maintain jobs. Senior legislative official Xin Chunying noted, 
“the labor contract law has nothing to do with the financial crisis.”xci  But 
the government did take steps to prod employers to maintain employment. 
For example, in July 2008, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions 
(ACFTU) began trying to unionize large foreign companies operating in 
China.  These companies must pay 2% of payroll to local and national 
union coffers.  However, many of the firms surveyed by the US China 
business council in 2009 said that the union pressure had declined. The US 
China Business Council surmised that the government and union 
leadership decided not to push unionization while companies were “feeling 
the economic downturn.” xcii 
 Moreover, the China Labor Bulletin claimed that with the onset of 
the global economic crisis, federal and provincial officials “became even 
more willing to turn a blind eye to routine violations of labor laws as long 
as enterprises did not lay off large numbers of employees at one time.”  The 
China Labor Bulletin gave several examples of steps that employers had 
taken to reduce their labor costs.  Some firms refused to give their 
employees pensions as required under the law for employees who had 
served ten year or more; other companies laid off long-serving staff or 
forced them to sign new short-term employment contracts. xciii  Other firms 
let workers go and then offered to rehire them as temporary workers.  
Such behavior is banned under the new labor law.xciv Many migrant 
workers have become increasingly restive in response to the law. They have staged strikes, road blockades and sometimes violent protests in an 
attempt to get local governments to enforce the law. According to the an 
international survey of trade union conditions in China,  “Most companies 
that go bankrupt give no notice to the workers and leave them underpaid 
or unpaid with little hope of any form of compensation or redundancy 
payments. Most of the companies reducing staff are doing so with little 
regard for the Labor Contract Law which details compensation procedures 
and consultation process before layoffs. For example, Guangdong 
Provincial authorities stated that between September and October 2008, in 
Dongguan alone, 117 employers of Hong Kong origin went into hiding 
owing unpaid wages to some 20,000 workers.”xcv 
The central government resolved to stimulate domestic demand. In 
2009 China put in place a large ($586 billion) stimuli program, which 
includes requirements that "government-funded projects should purchase 
domestic products unless they cannot be obtained under reasonable 
business conditions." It also seemed designed to discourage imports 
because it stipulated that imports paid for from the government's $586 
billion stimulus plan must be approved in advance.xcvi  
China continued to focus on exports to maintain and create jobs. In 
2008, policy makers increased VAT rebates several times in 2008 on labor-
intensive products such as clothing, textiles, and high value added 
electrical machinery products. The products affected represent 
approximately one quarter of China’s total exports. The government then 
again increased the scope of products eligible for such rebates in November 
and December 2008.xcvii Economist Eswar Prasad observed that “China’s focus on maintaining export competitiveness to prevent job losses is clearly 
trumping longer-term considerations of rebalancing growth and reducing 
reliance on exports.”xcviii In a study of China’s protective measures for 
global trade alert, Yunxia Yue found that by maintaining and increasing 
protectionism of labor intensive products, export growth quickly 
resumed.xcix 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
On November 15, 2008, Chinese President Hu Jintao attended the 
summit 
meeting of the Group of 20 (G-20) countries in Washington, D.C. to discuss 
the global financial crisis. Hu stated that “steady and relatively fast 
growth in 
China is in itself an important contribution to international financial 
stability and 
world economic growth.”c Hu might also argue that China had done more 
to provide jobs for its people than any other nation.  However, as noted in 
the introduction, China’s “cheap exchange rate” has depressed wages and 
boosted savings and investment.  The ever growing supply of labor has 
thwarted the ability of labor in China and abroad to demand higher wages.  
And the Chinese leadership’s determination to maintain jobs in China is 
also distorting trade. 
  A growing number of analysts and diplomats, including economist 
Paul Krugman argue that it has deliberately achieved an export surplus by 
manipulating its currency and its workers. Krugman wrote, “Chinese 
mercantilism may end up reducing U.S. employment by around 1.4 million jobs.”  But as Krugman well knows, trade is not a zero sum game.  With its 
efficient and productive workers, Chinese factories have churned out more 
goods at affordable prices. In so doing, China has increased demand for 
wide range of traded goods and services and thereby created and 
maintained jobs overseas as well.ci  
  I am making a different point. China’s trade and employment 
practices are inconsistent with its WTO obligations. By joining the WTO, 
China’s domestic policies can be subject to the scrutiny of the WTO.cii  
China’s new labor law was supposed to empower workers and set clearer 
standards for employers. Labor law violations such as violating labor sub-
contracting rules and bonded labor were clearly made illegal. But there is 
growing evidence the law has been at best unevenly enforced and at worst 
ignored.ciii The failure to enforce the law is distorting trade.  
  Governments have tried to use both the carrot and stick to change 
China’s behavior.  The EU is China’s largest trading partner.  It has long 
relied on dialogue and capacity building projects to improve the rule of law 
in China. But EU member states recognize this approach has not changed 
Chinese practices.  Germany, Britain, Sweden and the Netherlands are 
willing to challenge China for its labor law practices, while other EU 
member states prefer to use anti-dumping regulations.civ  Given this 
divide, they are unlikely to develop an effective strategy.  
Meanwhile, the US has also adopted a bifurcated strategy, reflecting 
differences among Congress and the Executive, as well as Republicans and 
Democrats. Like the EU, the US government relies on bilateral dialogue 
and capacity building. However, U.S. policymakers are much more willing to act unilaterally. For example, the U.S. uses the web and publications to 
discuss, “name and shame” China for its failure to enforce its own laws and 
internationally accepted labor rights.  China has responded to these 
reports by saying on one hand, “China is still a developing country,” and on 
the other by pointing out America’s own labor law deficiencies (which are 
plentiful).   
In addition, both the EU and the US have tried to encourage their 
firms to act responsibly in China by using voluntary corporate social 
responsibility initiatives. CSR strategies can include codes of conduct, 
social audits or factory certifications designed to voluntarily promote labor 
rights.  However, firms that act to protect labor rights find it difficult to 
compete with employers that violate China’s labor norms.cv  In fact many 
manufacturers sourcing in China complained about China’s new labor laws 
as they were developed.cvi  
Taken in sum, these strategies probably won’t change China’s 
behavior because they are not sufficient incentives to the government to 
improve enforcement; nor are these strategies effective at helping workers 
demand the rights delineated in the labor law.  As the founders of the ILO 
and the GATT recognized, nations are more likely to be effective—to 
change market conditions by collaborating.  The WTO is the appropriate 
venue for such action. First, we should make better use of the trade policy 
review process to hold China to account for its domestic policies that can 
distort trade—whether these policies are domestic stimuli or the failure to 
enforce provincial and national leaders to fully enforce Chinese labor laws.  This issue should also be addressed generically as part of the larger G-20 
mandate to examine WTO member responses to the global financial crisis.  
Moreover, it is important to note that China is not the only country 
which has changed its labor practices in response to the global downturn. 
The International Confederation of trade unions noted that in many 
countries workers have been threatened by employers with relocation, 
outsourcing and downsizing.  These problems are not confined to the 
developing world. Meanwhile, in industrialized countries, the ICFTU found 
that employers are increasingly relying on contract labor, third-party” 
labour agency employment which has eroded incomes, conditions and 
rights at work.cvii  
The relationship between trade employment and labor rights is 
made more challenging by policy incoherence at the global and national 
levels.  As noted in the introduction, policymakers are charged with 
addressing the employment needs of their citizens, not the global 
community, just as they are charged with making trade policy for the 
benefits of their citizens.  This should signal that we need a more honest 
and fuller discussion of the relationship between trade and employment 
and labor rights.   
The WTO offers avenues to address this lack of coherence between 
trade, employment and labor rights.   Under GATT Article XXIII, any 
country in the WTO is entitled to a "right of redress" for changes in 
domestic policy that systematically erode market access commitments even 
if no explicit GATT rule has been violated. Such a “non-violation” 
complaint entitles the aggrieved party either to compensation in the form of other tariff concessions to “rebalance” market access commitments or 
the complaining partner may withdraw equivalent concessions of its 
own.cviii According to legal scholar Joost Pauwelyn, "In non-violation cases 
a WTO panel could, indeed, be called upon to refer to non-WTO rules […] 
in its assessment of whether certain governmental measures, though not 
in violation of WTO rules, have affected the ‘legitimate expectations’ that 
could have been derived from a trade concession.”  Thus a complainant 
could invoke these non-WTO rules along the following lines: ‘when we 
obtained your trade concession (duty free access for our IPODs), we did so 
with the expectation that you would continue to respect international labor 
standards and your own labor laws.  But as noted by international 
observers, Chinese NGOs, scholars and others, it is clear that you are 
ignoring international labor obligations and your own labor laws in 
factories that produce for export (such as those that supply foreign 
companies such as Apple).  Thus, your country has violated these non-
WTO rules.  “This violation of labor standards does not violate WTO rules 
as such, but it does nullify the trade value of your concession, a 
nullification that we could not have foreseen […] so as per WTO rules, we 
are requesting compensation for this nullification under the heading of 
non-violation’."cix   
Such a trade dispute may not succeed.  Law professor Simon Lester 
notes, “It would be hard to prove that lack of enforcement could not 
reasonably have been anticipated; and proving causation in relation to 
undermining market access for specific products could be difficult.”cx But a 
multilateral approach would bring the issue to global attention.  Merely by taking this approach, China might be moved to do a better job of educating 
managers, policymakers and workers on the new law and of monitoring its 
enforcement at the local level.  Such a strategy would provide incentives to 
China to enforce its own laws, which could allow China to do a better job of 
reconciling the imperative of full employment with its obligations not to 
distort trade and to enforce its own laws.   
China’s membership in the WTO has no doubt provided benefits for 
the people of the world.  But China is exporting its inadequate governance: 
its unsafe food, toys, and medicines; corruption; its failure to protect 
intellectual property, and the failure to sufficiently enforce its own labor 
laws. China’s governance problems have become our problems.  We are 
complicit in this problem unless we act to address it. After all, The 
GATT/WTO, and its sister institutions—the UN and the Bretton Woods 
Institutions were built on a radical idea—that at the national levels 
nations had a responsibility to their citizens to create conditions for 
economic growth and job creation and that nations had a responsibility to 









                                                 
i An early version of this article was prepared for Professor Petros Mavroidis, 
China in the WTO: An Early Harvest. 
ii Hubert Escaith, Nannette Lindenberg, and Sebastien Miroudot, “International supply Chains 
and Trade Elasticity in times of global Crisis,” 2/2010, 3, 5 at http://mpra.ub.uni                                                                                                                                              
muenchen.de/20478/1/MPRA_paper_20478.pdf; for an interesting overview of the crisis, see 
the individual chapters in Richard Baldwin, “The Great Trade Collapse: Causes, Consequences 
and Prospects,” at http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4297 
 
 
iii ILO, “Global Employment Trends,” January 2009, 7, 9, at 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---
dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_101461.pdf and Somovia quote at 
http://www.stwr.org/global-financial-crisis/financial-crisis-unemployment-
working-poor-and-vulnerable-employment-to-increase.html 
iv  Policymakers struggle to get out of a recession with high unemployment.  
Credit defaults are highly correlated with the unemployment rate, so as 
unemployment rises, defaults rise, and defaults impair bank capital, causing a 
further tightening of credit.  Tight credit makes it harder for business to invest 
in people or technologies, and the failure to do so, will keep unemployment 
high.  
v For an interesting analysis of this, see, Gunter Schucher, “China’s 
Employment Crisis-A Stimulus for Polic Change? Journal of current Chinese 
Affairs 38, 2, 121-144.    
vi Information Office of the State Council, “China’s Employment Situation and 
Policies,” 4/26/2004, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-
04/26/content_326356.htm 
vii Geoff Dyer, “China Sets Sights on 8% Economic Growth,” Financial Times, 
3/5/2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/47bce284-0929-11de-b8b0-




viii On labor law, http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/labor+law 




xi  Drusilla K. Brown, “Labor Standards: Where do they Belong on the 
International Trade Agenda,” Tufts University Working Paper, 2001, pp. 29-
31, http://ase.tufts.edu/econ/papers/200113.pdf ; and Kyle Bagwell and 
Robert W. Staiger, “The Simple Economics of Labor Standards and the GATT," 
NBER Working Paper No. 6604, 1998. 
xii Negotiating Group on dispute Settlement, “Non-violation complaints Under 
GATT Article XXIII:2, Note by the Secretariat, MTN.GNG/NG13/W/31, at 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/history/urdsu/w31.pdf; and Jean Monnet Center, 
Evolution of Non-violation Cases, 
centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/papers98/98-9—html. 
xiii The accession agreement is at 
http://www.mac.doc.gov/China/WTOAccessionPackage.htm. 
xiv Kenneth Dam, “China as a Test Case: Is the Rule of law Essential for 
Economic Growth?”                                                                                                                                               
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=880125. See especially 
fn. 205. 
xv http://wss.hkcampus.net/~wss-6489/en/02/020126.html; Nicholas Lardy, “China 
and the World Trade Organization: Problems on the road to Liberalization,” 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan003154.pdf;  Martin 
G. Hu, “WTO’s Impact on the Rule of Law in China,” Mansfield Dialogues in 
Asia; and WTO, “WTO Ministerial Conference Approves China’s Accession,” 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr252_e.htm. 
xvi  According to Bloomberg news, “Foreign direct investment surged 103 
percent from a year earlier in December to $12.1 billion, the Ministry of 
Commerce reported in Beijing today. The value was the second highest on 
record, according to Bloomberg data.”  Investment in China fell 2.6 percent in 
all of 2009 to $90.03 billion as the global crisis sapped companies’ finances. 
China’s non-financial outbound investment rose 6.5 percent to $43.3 billion. 
Bloomberg, “China Says U.S. Is Backsliding on Trade, Warns on Google 
(Update 2), 1/15/2010,   http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-01-
15/china-says-u-s-backsliding-on-trade-warns-on-google-update2-.html 
xvii  Testimony of John Frisbie, President, U.S.-China Business Council, 
“China’s Implementation of Its World Trade Organization Commitments,” 
Trade Policy Staff Committee Hearing, 10/2/2009, 
http://www.uschina.org/public/documents/2009/10/wto_testimony.pdf.  
For an overview of china’s imports and exports, see 
www.uschina.org/statistics/tradetable.html, up to date for 2008.   
xviii  Commission on Growth, “The Growth Report: Strategies for Sustained 
Growth and Inclusive Development,” 2009, 93-94, The Commission on Growth 
and Development was set up to examine the policies and strategies that 
underlie rapid and sustained growth and poverty reduction. It was chaired by 
Nobel Laureate Michael Spence, and Danny Leipziger, Vice-President, World 
Bank, was the Commission's Vice-Chair. 
http://www.growthcommission.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=v
iew&id=13&Itemid=58 
xix In 2005 China officially removed the peg to the dollar, and the yuan 
gradually became stronger, moving from 8.35 to the dollar to about 6.8 in July 
2008.  But with the financial crisis they again made the link and tried to 
prevent the yuan from strengthening. The yuan has fallen against the Euro 
since 2005.  Wayne M. Morrison and Mark Labonte,  “ China’s Currency: A 
Summary of the Economic Issues,” CRS Report, 12/7/2009, RS21625;  Ernest 
Preeg, “Free Trade Agreements in Asia: US Exports at Risk and Much More,” 
Manufacturers Alliance, 2/2009, 
http://www.aei.org/docLib/Asian%20FTAs.pdf; Stephen Castle and Carter 
Doughterty, “EU to Press China Over Yuan,” New York Times, 11/23/2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/23/business/worldbusiness/23iht-
currency.5.8461214.html; and James A. Reddy, “EU voices Frustration with 
China’s Currency Policy,” Wall Street Journal, 12/28/2009, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487039394045745652710543763
20.html                                                                                                                                              
xx  On a bilateral basis, the yuan is undervalued by 41 percent against the U.S. 
dollar, according to a January 2010 study by the Institute for International 
Economics. John Williamson and William Cline, “Notes on Equilibrium 
Exchange Rates,” PB 10-2, http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb10-02.pdf 
Also see http://blogs.ft.com/economistsforum/2009/12/why-
china%E2%80%99s-exchange-rate-policy-concerns-us/; and Knowledge at 
Wharton, “The Costs of China’s Currency policy,” 1/21/10 at 
http://www.forbes.com/2010/01/21/china-currency-policy-entrepreneurs-
finance-wharton.html?boxes=Homepagechannels 
xxi Dani Rodrik, “What’s so Special About China’s Exports?” paper prepared 
for China and the global Economy, 2010; Pranab Bardhan, ‘Challenges for 
China at sixty-Part I,” Yaleglobal,  
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/challenges-china-sixty-%E2%80%93-part-
i; and Paul Krugman, “ Chinese New Year,” New York Times, 12/31/2009 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/01/opinion/01krugman.html. 
xxii Michael Dooley, David Folkerts-Landau and Peter Garber “An Essay on the 
Revived Bretton-Woods System”, NBER Working Paper No. 9971, September, 
2003; and Michael Wines, “China’s Economic Power Unsettles the Neighbors,” 
New York Times, 12/9/2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/10/world/asia/10jakarta.html.  The 
recent revelations that Chinese hackers had hacked into Google have led some 
companies to consider (or reconsider) abandoning China despite its huge 
potential market.  Steven Mufson and Peter Whoriskey, “Does China’s big 
market come with a bigger headache?” Washington Post, 1/15/2010, A14.  
xxiii  Shaun Breslin, “Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics: the Public, the 
Private and the International,” Working Paper 104, 2004, 3,  
http://wwwarc.murdoch.edu.au/wp/wp104.pdf; Niall Ferguson and Moritz 
Schularick, “The End of Chimerica,” Harvard Business School Working Paper, 
10-037, 2009, p. 14-15; on labor costs see Judith Banister, “Manufacturing in 
China today: Employment and labor compensation,” EPWP, The Conference 
Board, September 2007, pp.4-5 http://www.conference-
board.org/worldwide/china.cfm. 
xxiv Global brands and retailers put tremendous pressure on manufacturers 
and suppliers to keep costs from rising. AFL CIO, Representative Benjamin L. 
Cardin and Christopher Smith, Section 301 Petition before the US Trade 
Representative, 6/8/2006, 44-47; and Department of State, 2008 Human Rights 
Report: China, www.state.gov/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eap/119037.htm#. 
xxv Quotation from Jamil Anderlini, “Rule of the Iron Rooster,” Financial 
Times, 8/25/2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f41d5786-910d-11de-bc99-
00144feabdc0.html?nclick_check=1 
xxvi Gregory C. Chow, “The Impact of Joining WTO on China’s Economic, 
Legal and Political Institution,” Speech at City University of Hong Kong, 
3/22/2001, www.princeton.edu/~gchow/WTO.pdf 
xxvii  Congressional Executive Commission on China, 2009 Annual Report, 1, 
quotation p. 5.  
xxviii European Business in China “Position Paper 2009-2010,” Executive 
summary, 9-13; at http://www.euccc.com.cn/view/media/publications; and                                                                                                                                              
U.S. China Business Council 2009 Member Priorities Survey Results, “US 
Companies China Outlook,” 14-17, 
http://www.uschina.org/public/documents/2009/10/uscbc_member_surve
y.pdf 
xxix European Business in China “Position Paper 2009-2010,” Executive 
Summary;  USTR, 2009 National Trade Estimates Report,  
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/reports/2009/NTE/asset
_upload_file868_15464.pdf; and  U.S. China Business Council 2009 Member 
Priorities Survey Results, “US Companies China Outlook,2009 ” 9-13. 
xxx Chad P. Bown, “the global Resort to  Antidumping, Safeguards and other 
Trade Remedies Amidst the Economic Crisis, World Bank Policy Research 
working Paper 50158, Septemver 2009, http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2009/09
/14/000158349_20090914083619/Rendered/PDF/WPS5051.pdf 
xxxi In indicators of the rule of law, china ranks relatively low.  See as example, 
World trade Indicators at 
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/wti/2b1.asp?pillarID=1&indList=66,118,15
2,156,157,158,159,410,161,190&cid=41&comparator=i2&vr=Value&timeperiod




xxxii European Business in China “Position Paper 2009-2010 
http://www.euccc.com.cn/view/media/publications; David Barbuda and 
Brad Stone, “China, Where U.S. Internet Companies Often Fail,” New York 
Times 1/15/2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/16/technology/16failure.html; and  
Steven Mufson and Peter Whoriskey, “Does China’s Big market Come with a 
bigger headache?”http://www.euccc.com.cn/view/media/publicationsINA POSITION  
xxxiii Susan Ariel Aaronson, Trade and the American Dream: A Social History 
of Postwar Trade Policy (Lexington: University of Kentucky, 1996), pp. 17-40. 
The ITO was the most comprehensive international economic agreement ever 
negotiated; it had provisions setting rules of behavior for the use of import 
quotas, exchange controls, state trading, commodity agreements, policies to 
achieve full employment; and rules to regulate investment and economic 
development.  This is an archival history of the ITO, GATT, and WTO.  See pp. 
17-40. 
xxxiv The Havana Charter at  
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/misc/havana.pdf 
xxxv  Aaronson, Trade and the American Dream, 5, 114-132 and William 
Diebold, Jr. “The End of the I.T. O,” Essays in International Finance 16, 
(October 1952), 1-37.  Many factors contributed to the demise of the ITO 
including changing international circumstances, party politics, special interest 
opposition and Truman Administration ambivalence. 
xxxvi Susan Ariel Aaronson, Taking Trade to the Streets: The Lost History of 
Public Efforts to shape Globalization (Ann Arbor: Michigan, 2001), pp 54-55, 
fns. 110-112.                                                                                                                                              
xxxvii http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/index_g_e.htm 
xxxviii  Steve Charnovitz, “The (Neglected) Employment dimension of the World 
Trade Organization,” Accepted Paper, at ssrn.com/abstract=680141.  
Charnovitz notes the preamble is actionable. He says that “In its decision in 
the Tariff Preferences case, the Appellate Body stated that the Preamble 
“informs” all WTO covered agreements. “ European Communities – 
Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, 
Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS246/AB/R, para. 161 (adopted 20 April 
2004). 
xxxix Commission on Growth and Development, “The Growth Report: 
Strategies for Sustained Growth and Inclusive Development,  2009, 93-94.   For 
an excellent overview of the debate, see Mita Aggarwal, International Trade, 
Labor Standards and Labor Market Conditions: An Evaluation of the 
Linkages, US International Trade Commission Working Paper 95-06-C, 1995; 
David Kucera, “The Effect of Core Workers Rights on labour costs and foreign 
Direct Investment: Evaluating the Conventional Wisdom,” International 
Institute for Labour Studies Discussion Paper 130, 2001; and Drusilla Brown, 
“International Trade and Core Labor Standards: A Review of the Literature,” 
Department of Economics, Tufts Discussion Paper, 2000-05  
http://ase.tufts.edu/econ/papers/200005.pdf 
xl OECD, “Trade, Employment and Labour Standards:  A Study of Core 
Workers Rights and International Trade,”  1996.  
xli Article 2, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 





xliii Peri, Giovanni and Francisco Requena (2009) “The Trade Creation Effect of 
Immigrants: Evidence from the Remarkable Case of Spain”, NBER Working 
Paper # 15625, November, 2009.. 
xliv G-20, Declaration, “Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy,” 
11/15/2008, http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20_summit_declaration.pdf 
xlv London Summit Communiqué: A Plan for Global Recovery and Reform,” 
4/2/2009, http://www.pittsburghsummit.gov/resources/125131.htm 
xlvi  According Trade Alert, an international monitoring organization, the US 
has 46 such measures (either proposed or adopted) while China has 29. The 
difference in the number of “protectionist” measures may reflect greater 
democracy and transparency in the US rather than greater protectionist intent 
or actions.  
http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure?tid=All&tid_1=494&tid_3=All 
xlvii WTO, “Report on G20 Trade and Investment Measures,” 9/14/2009, See 
Annex 1 and 2.  See pp. 26-27 for China’s measures. 
xlviii WTO Trade Policy Review Body, WT/TPR/OV/12, p. A-35. 
xlix G-20, “Leaders Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit,” 9/24-25/2009,   
http://www.pittsburghsummit.gov/mediacenter/129639.htm                                                                                                                                              
l http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/faq/Rule_of_Law.shtml.  The rule of law helps set the 
“rules of the game” in critical areas such as investments, property, and 
contracts. The rule of law also serves as an important assurance of social rights 
and government accountability. Governmental restraint is especially critical 
for many transitioning economies where a previously planned economy is to 
be transformed into one that is market-based. When the government is no 
longer the sole owner of land, capital, and labor, the rule of law guarantees 
that the crucial elements of the economy will be free from arbitrary 
governmental actions  
li  Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravsik, and Stephen Macedo, "Democracy-
Enhancing Multilateralism," International Organization (Winter 2009), 18.  
lii WTO, “Understanding the WTO,” 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm; and Address by James 
Bacchus, Chairman, Appellate Body, WTO, “Groping Towards Grotius: the 
WTO and the International Rule of Law,”  
liii While complaints based upon an alleged "failure of another contracting 
party to carry out its obligations under this Agreement" (Article XXIII:l(a)) are 
sometimes referred to as "violation complaints", complaints invoking Article 
XXIII:1(b) have in a few instances been denoted as "non-violation complaints"1 
or as being based on "the well-established principle of non-violation 
nullification or impairment".2 But the term "non-violation complaint" has 
never been precisely defined by GATT contracting parties. 
liv Breslin, “Capitalism with Chinese, “15-19. 
lv Julia Ya Qin, “China, India, and the Law of the World Trade Organization,” 
Wayne State law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, No. 07-31, 2008,  
14-8, at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1016208 
lvi  From 1995- April 2009, some 25 countries have acceded to the WTO--
.Albania,  Republic of Armenia, Bulgaria, Cambodia,  Cape Verde, China,  Croatia, 
Ecuador,  Estonia,  Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia,  Jordan,  Kyrgyz 
Republic, Latvia,  Lithuania, Moldova,  Mongolia, Nepal,  Oman,  Panama,  Saudi 
Arabia,  Chinese Taipei, Tonga, Ukraine, and Vietnam.  Aaronson reviewed the 
accession process of 9 countries including China.   
lvii  WTO, “Accession of the People’s Republic of China, Decision of 10 
November 2001,” WT/L/432, (A) 1, 2, http://www.wto.org. 
lviii  Ibid. Sections (B), (C), 3.  
lix  Karen Halverson, “China’s WTO Accession,”and China Trade Policy 
Review,WT/TPR/S/199, x-xi. 
lx Ya Qin, “China, India, and the Law,” 18-19. 
lxi Douglas Zhihua Zeng, “China’s Employment Challenges and Strategies 
after the WTO Accession, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 3522, 
2/2005,  2,  
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/137740/Zeng3522.pdf; 
China’s State Council, November 200: 
http://www.mingong123.com/news/13/200811/e0662ce6a21a2a9f.html; and 
Ray Brooks and Ran Tao, “China’s Labor Market Performance and 
Challenges,” IMF Working Paper WP/03/210, 11/2003, Table 1.                                                                                                                                               
lxii Dic Lo, “What Are the macro Drivers of Growth Employment and Income 
in the Chinese Economy-A Case Study in Policy Coherence and Sequencing,” 
Prepared for the ILO, June 2007, 6-7, 
http://www.networkideas.org/ideasact/Jun07/Beijing_Workshop_07/Dic_L
o.pdf 
lxiii European Business in China, Position Paper, “Human Resources Forum,” 
66, http://www.euccc.com.cn/images/documents/pp_2009-
2010/human_resources_en.pdf and Wang Wei, “Cold Winter for Law 
Graduates,” China Daily, 1/5/2010 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/metro/2010-01/05/content_9265492.htm;  
lxiv Giordano Mion, Hylke Vandenbussche, and Linke Zhu, “Trade with China 
and Skill Upgrading: Evidence from Belgian Firm level Date,” 10/2009, LICOS 
Discussion Paper no. 248; Nigel Driffield and P.C. Chiang, “The Effect of 
Offshoring to China: reallocation, Employment and productivity in Taiwan,” 
International Journal of the Economics of Business, Vol. 16, 1, 2/2009, pp. 19-
38.  One of the earliest working papers was Marian Jansen, “International 
Trade and the Position of European Unskilled Labor.” WTO Working Paper, 
2001, http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ae0001_e.htm 
lxv Robert E. Scott, “The China Trade Toll: Widespread Wage Suppression, 2 
million jobs lost in the U.S.,” EPI Briefing Paper, #219, 7/30/2008, 1, 21. 
lxvi Marion Jansen and Eddy Lee for the ILO and WTO, Trade and 
Employment: Challenges for Policy Research, 16, 45. 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/ilo_e.pdf 
lxvii UNDP, “Toward Human Development with Equity,” China Human 
Development Report,  
lxviii China Labor Bulletin, “Going it Alone: The Workers movement in China,” 
7/9/2009,  35 at  
http://www.clb.org.hk/en/files/share/File/research_reports/workers_movement_07-08.pdf. 
Pages 14-57 
  13, 35-37.  
lxix Breslin, “Capitalism with Chinese,”  get page 
lxx Lo, “What Are,” 29-33.  
lxxi Neil Gouh, “Trouble on the Line,” Time Asia, 
1/23/2005http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1019909,00.html#ixzz0bbj
AfYQH 
lxxii The revised law requires employment contracts for all workers; minimum 
terms implied by law or collective agreement if no written contract; limits 
continuous casual employment; but, part-time workers who average less than 
24 hours/week may be hired without contract and on at-will basis; employer 
must allow unions; and finally, employers must consult with the union before 
adopting or changing policies that have a “direct bearing” on matters of 
interest to employees.  Workplace Professor Blog, 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/2007/07/labor-law-
refor.html 
lxxiii Harper Ho, Virginia E., “From Contracts to Compliance? An Early Look At 
Implementation Under China’s New Labor Legislation,” 2008, 2. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1432708.                                                                                                                                              
lxxiv Earl V. Brown, Jr., Solidarity Center, “Testimony to the Congressional 
Executive Commission on China,” 6/19/2009, at www.cecc.gov.  
lxxv US Department of State, 2008 Human Rights Report: China, 
www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eap/119037.htm# 
lxxvi Shai Oster, “China Faces Unrest as Economy Falters,” WSJ Online, 
12/23/2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122990342979025141.html and 
Economist, “Arbitration needed: What Lies Behind the Gruesome Death of a 
manager at Tonhua Iron and Steel,” Economist, 7/30/2009. 
lxxvii Harper Ho, Virginia E., “From Contracts to Compliance?” and Aaron 
Halegua, “Getting Paid: Processing the labor disputes of china’s Migrant 
workers,” Berkeley Journal of International Law, Vol 26, no. 1, 320-322.  
lxxviii Sean Cooney, “Making Chinese labor law Work: The Prospects for 
Regulatory Innovation in the People’s Republic of China,” University of 
Melbourne, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 282.  
lxxix Department of State, “2008 Human rights Report: China,” 
lxxx http://www.ituc-csi.org/2009-survey-of-violations-of-trade,3789.html?lang=en; and 
http://www.china-labour.org.hk/en/node/100560 
lxxxi China Labor Watch, “Wal-Mart Standards Fail, Workers Suffer, November 
2009, www.chinalaborwatch.org.  
lxxxii China Labor Watch, “Investment giant KKR Profits from Dollar General’s 
Poor labor Record, Report Shows,” December 22, 2009, 
http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/20091222kkrdollargeneral.htm 
lxxxiii Shenzhen Dagongzhe Migrant Worker Center, “New Ongoing Violations 
after the Implementation of labor contract law in China,” 6/12/2009, 
www.workerempowerment.org/en/newsletter/18.  Other examples of violations are at 
http://www.china-labour.org.hk/en/node/100019 
lxxxivlxxxiv Alexandra Stevenson, “Labor law-One Year-On,” China International 
business magazine, 1/7/2009 
http://www.cibmagazine.com.cn/Features/Trend.asp?id=786&labor_law_-
_one_year_on.html 
lxxxv European business in China Position paper 2009-2010, “Human resources 
forum,” 66-69, quotation on p. 69, 
http://www.euccc.com.cn/images/documents/pp_2009-
2010/human_resources_en.pdf 
lxxxvi The International Trade Union Committee Annual Survey of Violations of 
Trade Union Rights said, “Provincial regulations issued in 2008 may however 
help develop more detailed contracts and a more genuine form of negotiation 
process. Several cities and provinces issued regulations which deal either with 
the implementation of existing labor legislation or give more details on 
collective contract procedures and contents.” http://survey09.ituc-
csi.org/survey.php?IDContinent=3&IDCountry=CHN&Lang=EN 
lxxxvii Ho, “From Contracts to compliance,”61; and China Labor Bulletin, ‘Labor 
Disputes Escalate in Beijing,” December 2009, http://www.china-
labour.org.hk/en/node/100628 
lxxxviii U.S. China Business Council 2009 Member Priorities Survey Results, “US 
Companies China Outlook: Recession Strings, but does not End Market 
Optimism,” Executive Summary, 4-5, 17-18.                                                                                                                                              
lxxxix  http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/11/unemployment-
around-the-world; “Economists: rising unemployment becomes China's top 
challenge,” China view, 2/09/2009 at  http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-
02/07/content_10778188.htm;  and China's efforts to create more jobs pay off: 
minister, China View, 12/19/2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-
12/19/content_12672696.htm 
Tyler Cowen, “Economic View: Dangers of an Overheated China,”  New York 
Times, 11/28/2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/29/business/economy/29view.html; and 
NA,  China’s Employment Situation “Grave,’ Minister, China Daily 3/10/2009 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009npc/2009-
03/10/content_7561971.htm 
xc Jamil Anderlini, “China battles unemployment to deter unrest” Financial 
Times, 12/12/2008; Douglas Zhihua Zeng, “China’s Employment Challenges 
and Strategies After the WTO Accession,” World Bank Policy research 
Working Paper 3522, February, 2005; and Bhalla, A. S. and S. Qiu, “China’s 
Accession to WTO: Its Impact on Chinese Employment.”UNCTD discussion 
paper, No. 163, November 2002.  
xci Xinhua, “China Won’t revise labor contract law amid financial Crisis: 
Lawmaker,” 3/9/2009,  
xcii U.S. China Business Council 2009 Member Priorities Survey Results, “US 
Companies China Outlook,” 17-18.  
xciii China Labor bulletin, Research Reports: “Going it Alone: The Workers 
movement in china (2007-2008), 7/9/2009, 10, at  
http://www.clb.org.hk/en/files/share/File/research_reports/workers_mov
ement_07-08.pdf 




xcvi Björn Etgen and Egmont Seeber China: Government Procurement In China: 
Can You Get A Piece Of The Pie?, 9/2009, at  
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=85690; and Baker Hostetler, 
“China Law Blog, http://www.chinaustradelawblog.com/articles/strategic-
economic-dialogue-1/ Circular 1361 was issued by the national Development 
and Reform commission, 
http://english.sina.com/business/2008/1109/197321.html for a timeline; and 
http://english.sina.com/z/090226stimuluspackage/index.shtml. The opinion 
on how to source was Circular 1361, Opinions on the Implementation of 
Decisions on Expanding Domestic Demand and Promoting Economic Growth 
and Further Strengthening Supervision of Tendering and Bidding for Construction 
Projects. 
xcvii US Trade Representative, 2009 National Trade Estimate, 14, 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/reports/2009/NTE/asset
_upload_file868_15464.pdf 
xcviii Plastemart, “China's stimulus spending fuels massive overexpansion could 
lead to protectism”11/27/2009, 
http://www.plastemart.com/Plasticnews_desc.asp?news_id=16659;                                                                                                                                              
http://english.sina.com/z/090226stimuluspackage/index.shtml; and Keith Bradsher, As 
China Stirs Economy, Some See Protectionism,” 6/24/2009,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/24/business/economy/24yuan.html?_r=
1 
xcix Yunxia Yue, “China’s Protective State measures in the Crisis Era: 
Motivation and Effect, in Simon J. Evenett, ed. The Unrelenting Pressure of 
Protectionism: The 3rd GTA Report, 2009, 84, at 
http://www.voxeu.org/reports/GTA3.pdf 
c Wayne M. Morrison, “China’s Economic conditions,” CRS Report for 
Congress, RL33534, 7.  
ci Morrison ,”7. 
cii Karen Halverson, “China’s WTO Accession,” 
http://www.bc.edu/schools/law/lawreviews/meta-
elements/journals/bciclr/27_2/06_TXT.htm; and Ya Qin, Trade, investment,” 
722. 
ciii One Congressman spoke (in bad English) of its “relative lack of impact.” 
Congressman Richard Larsen, Congressional Engagement: Notes from a US Congressman’s 
Trip to China, 8/11/2009, http://www.amchamchina.org/article/index/4688 
  
civ Dragon Nightmares: The European Union Finds it Hard to Agree over How 
to Deal With China,” Economist, 4/16/2009; 
http://www.delchn.ec.europa.eu/home_link_strategy.htm; and 
http://www.delchn.ec.europa.eu/euch_poli3.htm.  
cv Brown, “Testimony: Congressional-Executive Commission,” 11; OECD 
Investment  Policy Review: China 2008, Chapter 4: Encouraging Responsible 
Business Conduct in China,”  148-158 and 171-179. 
http://www.nlcnet.org/article.php?id=613; and China Business Review: 
Special Report: corporate Responsibility in China: Best Practices, May-June 
2009, www.chinabusinessreview.com/public/0905/corporate-responsibility.... 
Michael Santoro believes business can make a big difference by demanding 
the rule of law. Michael Santoro, “Soft Seat on the long March: Foreign 
Business and the Rule of Law in China,”, 2/5/2009, at 
ssrn.com/abstract=1415902 
cviNike Repudiates AmCham Position on Chinese Law Reform,” 12/20/2006;   
http://www.itglwf.org/DisplayDocument.aspx?idarticle=15269&langue=2; 
Foreign Policy in focus, “Labor rights in China,” 12/19/2006, 
http://www.fpif.org/articles/labor_rights_in_china 
cvii http://survey09.ituc-csi.org/survey.php?IDContinent=0&Lang=EN; and 
http://survey09.ituc-csi.org/survey.php?&mode=pr&IDCont=0&Lang=EN 
 
cviii Negotiating Group on dispute Settlement, “Non-violation complaints 
Under GATT Article XXIII:2, Note by the Secretariat, 
MTN.GNG/NG13/W/31, at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/history/urdsu/w31.pdf; 
and Jean Monnet Center, Evolution of Non-violation Cases, 
centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/papers98/98-9—html. 
cix Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO 
Law Relates to Other Rules of 
International Law, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 456.                                                                                                                                              
cx Comments of Simon Lester, International Economic Law and Policy Blog, 
http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2010/01/nonviolation-
complaints-and-the-enforcement-of-labor-laws.html 